



FALCO

digitalscepter

TLS Inbound Inspection

Like outbound-decrypt, but better.

Why do we need decryption?

What the firewall sees *without* decryption:

```
.....uJ...l.>k;.;...g.....1..... ..k.}>l.h.>..o0...|.....~  
...".....+./.....,0.  
...../5.....example.com.....  
.....#.....h2.http/1.1.....".  
.....3.k.i...  
X.-DS...!c.>...d.....fG.9..}>.....A...Q... ..}[G.....Nr}r...6S!.y.....5.!...o..E.S.Zte\./...+.....  
.....-.....@.....x.{.t....' {... *..bsj.S  
...k.}>l.h.>..o0...|.....~  
.....O.+.....3.E...A..r...0{.(.....!@..L.....0:.....-.....~.....Loep.\.".....<k.T.7v...u....Mm.H|.  
tal.IXB.....a_M[K..!..*...9.....5..U.....^/.W.b:r...s..].n.@.....d...5.w...  
.....5...dx..0..O.Lm.....w.yo.....Ep.....c1EL...2.q.f.3.O..t.=C.Y..k.n...fw..r.?9.=T..>.....O~...d,QB.m.kl.a.Q.  
...YUM.y.n...4=..[g..h....}>.....<..6.&7..."..B.T;..L.i.E.<r.""../.Snx..K..  
..rj..zBX.sE.u.....{~.A.Z@L.Y.  
..{...`Ynh..*;;!.....&2.`T.V2e..B...J...^!"v.teC.W.'..k....  
..X.L..~NUw.....S..Hc"|.....7.....9..._7A.@.+...F...u..d...6.Q..z..R.5.C.....z_..*..D...F.....*Ct9J.....by.....jh.|.&./E.GfOY]...;-...(.kE.a.....  
..s...?..&.d.).....C.....e.#3f.a...:D.....U...1...Ut..).?....P.V".....  
....<...`r3[...._R.
```

What the firewall sees *with* decryption:

GET /classes/details?id=CS101; DROP TABLE STUDENTS; HTTP/1.1

Host: example.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:98.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/98.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: keep-alive

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Pragma: no-cache

Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Encoding: gzip

Accept-Ranges: bytes

Age: 460608


Cache-Control: max-age=604800

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2022 23:54:11 GMT

Forward Proxy vs. Inbound Inspection

Forward Proxy (aka. Outbound Decrypt)




Inbound Inspection



Outbound vs. Inbound

- CA cert must be installed on all devices
 - Outbound decrypt requires constant tuning
 - Not all site traffic can be decrypted
 - Can't decrypt devices you don't control
 - Protects user from themselves
- Certs installed on the firewall
 - Configured once, updated occasionally
 - All services you control can be decrypted
 - Only need control of the server side
 - Protects servers from outside attackers

How it works: Low-Level



Inbound Inspection Requirements

- Valid public certificates for the servers you want to intercept
- An understanding of the TLS versions & ciphers currently in-use
- No client cert based authentication

Inbound Inspection Project Plan

1. Ensure that all decrypting firewalls are running PAN-OS $\geq$ 10.0.0
2. Get a list of all the services you want to decrypt
3. Identify any need for specific TLS versions or ciphers
4. Gather certificates for all services (or a wildcard if possible)
5. Import all certificates into the firewall
6. Create a decryption profile
7. Create decryption rules to decrypt inbound connections to those services
8. Validate that applications work as expected

Decryption Profile



Name

SSL Decryption

No Decryption

SSH Proxy

SSL Forward Proxy

SSL Inbound Inspection

SSL Protocol Settings

Unsupported Mode Checks

- ☒ Block sessions with unsupported versions
- ☒ Block sessions with unsupported cipher suites

Failure Checks

- ☐ Block sessions if resources not available
- ☐ Block sessions if HSM not available
- ☐ Block downgrade on no resource

Note: For unsupported modes and failures, the session information is cached for 12 hours, so future sessions between the same host and server pair are not decrypted. Check boxes to block those sessions instead.

OK

Cancel

Aside: TLS Details

- In TLS a client and server must agree on details of three algorithms
 - Key Exchange
 - Encryption
 - Authentication
- **Key exchange** allows the peers to determine a shared secret key
- **Encryption** obscures the contents of the stream to prevent eavesdropping
- **Authentication** makes sure that an attacker hasn't tampered with the data
- There are lots of options for each
- Many options are insecure
- Future TLS versions are removing options to ensure security

Key exchange/agreement and authentication

Algorithm	SSL 2.0	SSL 3.0	TLS 1.0	TLS 1.1	TLS 1.2	TLS 1.3	Status
RSA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Defined for TLS 1.2 in RFCs
DH-RSA	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
DHE-RSA (forward secrecy)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ECDH-RSA	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
ECDHE-RSA (forward secrecy)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
DH-DSS	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
DHE-DSS (forward secrecy)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No ^[55]	
ECDH-ECDSA	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
ECDHE-ECDSA (forward secrecy)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ECDH-EdDSA	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
ECDHE-EdDSA (forward secrecy)^[56]	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
PSK	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
PSK-RSA	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
DHE-PSK (forward secrecy)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ECDHE-PSK (forward secrecy)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
SRP	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
SRP-DSS	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
SRP-RSA	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Kerberos	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
DH-ANON (insecure)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
ECDH-ANON (insecure)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
GOST R 34.10-94 / 34.10-2001^[57]	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Proposed in RFC drafts

Cipher security against publicly known feasible attacks

Cipher			Protocol version					
Type	Algorithm	Nominal strength (bits)	SSL 2.0	SSL 3.0 [n 1][n 2][n 3][n 4]	TLS 1.0 [n 1][n 3]	TLS 1.1 [n 1]	TLS 1.2 [n 1]	TLS 1.3
Block cipher with mode of operation	AES GCM ^{[58][n 5]}	256, 128	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Secure	Secure
	AES CCM ^{[59][n 5]}		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Secure	Secure
	AES CBC ^[n 6]		N/A	Insecure	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	N/A
	Camellia GCM ^{[60][n 5]}	256, 128	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Secure	N/A
	Camellia CBC ^{[61][n 6]}		N/A	Insecure	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	N/A
	ARIA GCM ^{[62][n 5]}	256, 128	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Secure	N/A
	ARIA CBC ^{[62][n 6]}		N/A	N/A	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	N/A
	SEED CBC ^{[63][n 6]}	128	N/A	Insecure	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	Depends on mitigations	N/A
	3DES EDE CBC ^{[n 6][n 7]}	112 ^[n 8]	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A
	GOST 28147-89 CNT ^{[57][n 7]}	256	N/A	N/A	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A
	IDEA CBC ^{[n 6][n 7][n 9]}	128	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A	N/A
	DES CBC ^{[n 6][n 7][n 9]}	56	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A	N/A
Stream cipher	ChaCha20-Poly1305 ^{[68][n 5]}	256	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Secure	Secure
	RC4 ^[n 11]	128	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A
		40 ^[n 10]	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A	N/A	N/A
None	Null ^[n 12]	–	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	Insecure	N/A

Data integrity

Algorithm	SSL 2.0	SSL 3.0	TLS 1.0	TLS 1.1	TLS 1.2	TLS 1.3	Status
HMAC-MD5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Defined for TLS 1.2 in RFCs
HMAC-SHA1	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
HMAC-SHA256/384	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
AEAD	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
GOST 28147-89 IMIT^[57]	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Proposed in RFC drafts
GOST R 34.11-94^[57]	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		

TLS 1.3 - OTHER

Usage

% of all users

÷ ?

Global

90.39% + 0.58% = 90.97%

Version 1.3 (the latest one) of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Removes weaker elliptic curves and hash functions.


Current aligned

Usage relative

Date relative

Filtered

All



Notes

Test on a real browser

Known issues (0)

Resources (5)

Feedback

- 1 Supports a draft of the TLS 1.3 specification, not the final version.
- 2 Can be enabled in Firefox by setting the `security.tls.version.max` pref to "4" in `about:config`.
- 3 Can be enabled in Chrome and Opera via the `#tls13-variant` flag in `chrome://flags` or `opera://flags`.
- 4 Partial support in Safari refers to being limited to macOS 10.14 Mojave and later.

Decryption Profile



Name

SSL Decryption | No Decryption | SSH Proxy

SSL Forward Proxy | SSL Inbound Inspection | **SSL Protocol Settings**

Protocol Versions

Min Version

Max Version

Key Exchange Algorithms

☒ RSA

☒ DHE

☒ ECDHE

Encryption Algorithms

☐ 3DES

☒ AES128-CBC

☒ AES128-GCM

☒ CHACHA20-POLY1305

☐ RC4

☒ AES256-CBC

☒ AES256-GCM

Authentication Algorithms

☐ MD5

☒ SHA1

☒ SHA256

☒ SHA384

Note: For unsupported modes and failures, the session information is cached for 12 hours, so future sessions between the same host and server pair are not decrypted. Check boxes to block those sessions instead.

OK

Cancel

Decryption Profile



Name

SSL Decryption

No Decryption

SSH Proxy

SSL Forward Proxy

SSL Inbound Inspection

SSL Protocol Settings

Protocol Versions

Min Version

Max Version **SSLv3.0 1996, insecure**

TLSv1.0 1999, insecure

TLSv1.1 2006, insecure

TLSv1.2 2008, okay

TLSv1.3 2018, best (requires PAN-OS ≥ 10.0.0)

Key Exchange Algorithms

☒ RSA

Encryption Algorithms

☐ 3DES

☒ AES128-CBC

☒ AES128-GCM

☒ CHACHA20-POLY1305

☐ RC4

☒ AES256-CBC

☒ AES256-GCM

Authentication Algorithms

☐ MD5

☒ SHA1

☒ SHA256

☒ SHA384

Note: For unsupported modes and failures, the session information is cached for 12 hours, so future sessions between the same host and server pair are not decrypted. Check boxes to block those sessions instead.

OK

Cancel

Decryption Profile



Name

SSL Decryption

No Decryption

SSH Proxy

SSL Forward Proxy

SSL Inbound Inspection

SSL Protocol Settings

Protocol Versions

Min Version

Max Version

Key Exchange Algorithms

☒ RSA **okay**

☒ DHE **better**

☒ ECDHE **best**

Encryption Algorithms

☐ 3DES
☐ RC4 } **insecure**

☒ AES128-CBC
☒ AES256-CBC } **okay**

☒ AES128-GCM
☒ AES256-GCM } **better**

☒ CHACHA20-POLY1305 **best**

Authentication Algorithms

☐ MD5 **insecure**

☐ SHA1 **insecure**

☒ SHA256 **good**

☒ SHA384 **best**

Note: For unsupported modes and failures, the session information is cached for 12 hours, so future sessions between the same host and server pair are not decrypted. Check boxes to block those sessions instead.

OK

Cancel

Decryption Policy Rule



General | Source | Destination | Service/URL Category | **Options**

Action ☐ No Decrypt ☒ Decrypt

Type SSL Inbound Inspection

Certificates ☐ CERTIFICATES ^

☐ LAN Root

+ Add - Delete

Decryption Profile Example-Decrypt-Profile

Log Settings

☐ Log Successful SSL Handshake

☒ Log Unsuccessful SSL Handshake

Log Forwarding None

OK

Cancel

GENERATE TIME	TYPE	FROM ZONE	TO ZONE	SOURCE	SOURCE USER	DESTINATION	DECRYPTED	TO PORT	APPLICATION	ACTION	RULE	SESSION END REASON
03/31 17:13:57	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	websocket	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	tcp-fin
03/31 16:51:45	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	git-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:51:34	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:51:33	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:46:28	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:41:54	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	websocket	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	tcp-fin
03/31 16:41:23	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:36:20	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:31:17	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:26:45	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	8443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:26:45	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	8443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:26:13	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:21:19	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	git-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:21:08	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:21:07	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:16:03	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out
03/31 16:10:59	end	vpn	inside	172.21.2.7	ds\zsum	10.1.131.35	yes	443	github-base	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	aged-out

Detailed Log View



General

Session ID 71357
Action allow
Action Source from-policy
Host ID
Application websocket
Rule Allow Admins to Inside
Rule UUID 17a9c58f-c013-43f0-b7b6-1d1951bbd124
Session End Reason tcp-fin
Category computer-and-internet-info
Device SN 011901033264
IP Protocol tcp
Log Action lf_standard
Generated Time 2022/03/31 17:13:57
Start Time 2022/03/31 16:41:37
Receive Time 2022/03/31 17:14:07
Elapsed Time(sec) 1920
Tunnel Type N/A

Source

Source User ds\zsum
Source 172.21.2.7
Source DAG
Country 172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255
Port 1912
Zone vpn
Interface tunnel.1
X-Forwarded-For IP 0.0.0.0

Destination

Destination User
Destination 10.1.131.35
Destination DAG
Country 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255
Port 443
Zone inside
Interface ae1.911

Details

Type end
Bytes 24528
Bytes Received 12904
Bytes Sent 11624
Repeat Count 1
Packets 186
Packets Received 80
Packets Sent 106
Source UUID
Destination UUID

Flags

Captive Portal ☐
Proxy Transaction ☐
Decrypted ☒
Packet Capture ☐
Client to Server ☐
Server to Client ☐
Symmetric Return ☐
Mirrored ☐
Tunnel Inspected ☐
MPTCP Options ☐
Recon excluded ☐

PCAP	RECEIVE TIME ^	TYPE	APPLICATION	ACTION	RULE	RULE UUID	BYTES	SEVERITY	CATEGORY	URL CATEGORY LIST	VERDICT	URL	FILE NAME
	2022/03/31 17:14:07	end	websocket	allow	Allow Admins to Inside	17a9c58f-c0...	24528		computer-and-internet-info				

Close

Troubleshooting

- Very similar to outbound decrypt
- Use **Monitor** → **Logs** → **Decryption** (only in PAN-OS $\geq 10.0.0$)
- Look for the **Error** and **Error Index** columns
- Most likely an incompatibility with the TLS version/cipher
- Use packet captures & hardware counters
 - `show counter global filter packet-filter yes delta yes`

Q & A

Thanks for attending!

Questions: support@digitalscepter.com

Contact: coleman@digitalscepter.com

Complaints: zach@digitalscepter.com